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A B S T R A C T   
The academic literature on trade-offs in ecosystem management has paid relatively little attention to justice and 
poverty reduction objectives. The aim of this paper is to highlight the multiple dimensions of trade-offs in 
ecosystem services management for poverty alleviation, and to support decision-makers in planning for the 
almost inevitable trade-offs arising from environmental interventions. The paper brings together different di-
mensions or lenses through which to analyse trade-offs in ecosystem management for poverty alleviation in a 
low-income country context. Following a literature review of trade-off decisions, the paper introduces the Bal-
ance Sheets Approach to structure trade-off analysis and appraise decisions. We apply the Balance Sheets 
Approach to analyse five case studies set in very different social-ecological systems where trade-offs were 
pertinent and undermined poverty alleviation. We show how the combination of ‘positive’ approaches, often 
used at strategic level, with ‘value’ approaches which analyse multiple values, multi-scale governance, power 
and capacity, is necessary to analyse complex trade-offs. Based on the case studies we identify four lessons for 
future trade-off analysis in the context of ecosystem management for poverty alleviation in low-income settings.   
1. Introduction 
Both poverty alleviation and the avoidance of ecosystem services 
(ES) degradation have become legitimate policy targets, not least 
through their integration in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
However, the multiple objectives of more sustainable ecosystems man-
agement and human wellbeing may not be compatible and attainable at 
the same time and place (Spaiser et al., 2019, Schaafsma and Bartkow-
ski, 2020). Recent analyses suggest that trade-offs between poverty 
alleviation and sustainable ecosystem management are already apparent 
at a global scale; trends over the last decades suggest natural capital is in 
decline, yet human wellbeing is increasing and absolute poverty is 
decreasing (Raudsepp-Hearne et al., 2010; Chaplin-Kramer et al., 2019). 
However, it is questionable that this global trend of reduced poverty will 
continue, as such trends do not reflect delayed impacts on wellbeing of 
ecosystem degradation over longer timeframes (Dearing et al., 2012; 
Roe et al., 2014). Recent rises in undernourishment as well as pandemic- 
related absolute poverty caution assumptions about the future contin-
uation of these trends (FAO et al., 2019; World Bank, 2020). 
The relationship between sustainable ecosystem management and 
poverty alleviation is debated (Cavendish, 2000; Adams et al., 2004; 
Gray and Moseley, 2005). Although studies have identified a diversity of 
interventions that have the potential to deliver both (e.g. Porro et al., 
2015; Baumert et al., 2016; Mudombi et al., 2018), evidence also shows 
that this potential is often not realised. Experience with a range of 
environmental and conservation interventions has shown that 
combining ecologically sustainable ecosystem management and poverty 
alleviation is problematic if not unachievable in many cases (Cinner 
et al., 2014, Ferraro and Hanauer, 2014, Dawson and Martin, 2015, 
Bidaud et al., 2017, Bluwstein, 2016, Dawson et al., 2016, Wunder et al., 
2018). Drawing on evidence from over 100 research projects, Mace et al. 
(2018) conclude that trade-offs between ecological sustainability and 
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poverty alleviation are ubiquitous. 
In places characterised by both high poverty rates and high levels of 
ecosystem and biodiversity threats, addressing trade-offs effectively is 
particularly important for achieving the SDGs. Lele et al. (2013) identify 
the omission of trade-offs as one of the weaknesses of ES frameworks, 
and relatively few ES studies address trade-offs empirically (Lautenbach 
et al., 2019). A considerable body of literature has addressed trade-offs 
in ecosystem management over time and space, between or within in-
dividuals and groups, and within and between ecological and social 
outcomes (Howe et al., 2014, Finkbeiner et al., 2018, see section 2). In 
part of this literature, co-occurrence of positive and negative impacts 
have sometimes been labelled as trade-offs even in the absence of evi-
dence for causality (Schaafsma and Bartkowski, 2020), whilst others use 
the term trade-offs for making values commensurable (Kohler et al., 
2019). Here, we define trade-offs as a situation where achieving one 
desirable outcome must come at the expense of the achievement of 
another desirable outcome, occurring at the production possibility 
frontier1 of a system and recognising that this frontier is set by societal 
and ecological boundaries that may change over time (Schaafsma and 
Bartkowski, 2020). Of particular interest to the paper are any ecosystem 
management decisions that come at the expense of poverty alleviation 
goals. 
The identification of trade-offs in strategic decisions, whether for 
future policies or in past events, has been considered an important 
aspect of evidence-based policy support, although to what extent it is 
‘better’ to make trade-offs explicit is disputed (Tetlock et al., 2017). The 
term ‘trade-off’ is political, and opponents argue it is used to justify 
losses based on a technocratic and rational decision (‘hard choices are 
unavoidable’) (e.g. Holland, 2002; Myers et al., 2018) and should first 
and foremost be avoided (Valencia, 2014). Conversely, proponents 
contend that one of the main advantages of being explicit about 
trade-offs is that it makes all aspects of a decision transparent, through 
analysis, deliberation or negotiation (Vira et al., 2012; Campbell et al., 
2010), allowing it to be evaluated by external parties (Keeney, 1982). 
Despite the political nature of trade-offs, much of the existing ES 
research on trade-offs has focused on the supply-side, i.e. of ES pro-
duction (Howe et al., 2014; Turkelboom et al., 2018). As a result, the 
social and governance aspects of trade-offs often remain understudied 
(Ellis et al., 2019; Lautenbach et al., 2019). Trade-offs between ES often 
involve trade-offs between different beneficiaries (Lele et al., 2013; 
Mace et al., 2018), where there is a conflict of interest. Firstly, consid-
eration of the social structures in which trade-offs are embedded could 
help to pre-empt or avoid conflicts and choices in cases where re-
lationships between groups in society are unequal or the social context 
or sets of values are ignored (Hirsch et al., 2011). Disagreements and 
conflicts about trade-off decisions result from diverging needs, aspira-
tions, visions, ideas about ‘best’ strategies, and motivations and value 
judgements of different actors (Kowarsch et al., 2017; Martín-López 
et al., 2019). Trade-off analysis therefore needs to pay attention to the 
diverse meanings and values of this social context, which motivate 
changes in governance and management, and in wellbeing and behav-
iour. Secondly, it is increasingly recognised that the governance and 
intervention systems that generate trade-offs are characterised by in-
justices and power imbalances (Martín-López et al., 2019; Menton et al., 
2020). 
Analysing the social and governance aspects of trade-offs requires a 
multiscale approach (Scholes et al., 2013), because the drivers and 
pressures on social-ecological systems, as well as the actors and the so-
cial processes they affect operate at different scales (Nunan, 2018). The 
actors’ needs, values, priorities, interests, power and capabilities may 
differ, leading to implicit or explicit disagreements and conflicts within 
and across scales. 
The overall goal of this paper is to provide recommendations to 
reveal and deal with the multiple dimensions of trade-offs in ecosystem 
management for poverty alleviation in a low-income country context. 
We do so in a way that addresses the social and governance aspects and 
reveals injustices in outcomes and processes of interventions. The paper 
thereby addresses the knowledge gap in the literature on trade-offs 
regarding the complexity of these trade-off decisions, amplified by the 
multi-level governance context and inequalities in wealth, interests and 
power between multiple actors. We achieve this via (a) a literature re-
view identifying the challenges for trade-off analysis in ecosystem 
management for poverty alleviation; and (b) the application of the 
Balance Sheets Approach to achieve a critical synthesis of findings from 
five research projects conducted in different social-ecological systems in 
low-income countries where such trade-offs emerged. In doing so, we 
highlight the utility of the Balance Sheet Approach as an organising 
framework for decision-making at all levels in identifying and planning 
for the almost inevitable trade-offs arising from environmental inter-
vention, and towards identifying options that better align different in-
terests in space and time. Thereby, we provide a framework for steering 
trade-off decisions towards ecosystem management that fosters poverty 
alleviation. 
Section 2 reviews the literature on trade-off analysis in ecosystem 
management for poverty alleviation, categorised into the so-called 
“positive” dimension of modelling and measuring, and the “value” 
dimension that considers values and moral choices, and just trade-off 
decisions (Robert and Zeckhauser, 2011). This categorisation is useful 
because although models provide trade-off analyses, normative trade- 
off decisions remain necessary due to uncertainty and true unknowns 
about future drivers and outcomes (Carpenter et al., 2006). Section 3 
outlines the case studies and methodology. Section 4 demonstrates how 
the positive and value dimensions feature in the different trade-off an-
alyses, and identifies emerging lessons for future trade-off analysis and 
decision-support for ecosystem management for poverty alleviation. 
2. Framing trade-offs in ecosystem services management for 
poverty alleviation: a literature review 
2.1. Dimensions of trade-off analysis 
The question of whether to manage ecosystems for poverty allevia-
tion is normative and debated extensively, around questions such as: 
what is possible, what is right, what is fair and whose values should 
count and be prioritised. Such normative choices are typically wicked or 
hard, involving value trade-offs (Hadari, 1988; Kooiman and Jentoft, 
2009). Robert and Zeckhauser (2011) distinguish two complementary 
dimensions in normative trade-off analysis: the positive dimension and 
the value dimension. The explicit recognition of these two dimensions 
is important because it highlights the limited perspective of ES supply 
trade-off analyses constrained to the positive dimension that dominate 
the literature. 
The aim of positive analysis is to support decision-making through 
decomposing the problem and issues at stake, and reducing it to a 
manageable format, largely through rationalisation and quantification 
using a range of models. Such analyses provide insight into the impacts 
of changes in drivers and pressures of social-ecological systems, and 
guide the design of interventions. However, they tend to ignore values, 
principles and emotions often associated with hard choices (Holland, 
2002, McShane et al., 2011). Section 2.2 exposes the focus, strengths 
and shortcomings of this approach. 
The value dimension engages with the social and governance aspects 
of trade-offs, recognises value plurality and is a key element of norma-
tive trade-off analysis, as described in Section 2.3. It inherently recog-
nises that the legitimacy of trade-off decisions depends on the possibility 
of bringing value dimensions together in a way that is acceptable to 
1 The production possibility frontier (PPF) is a curve that shows the highest 
amount of two goods that can be produced if all resources are efficiently used, 
and is regularly used in trade-off analyses (e.g. Cavender-Bares et al., 2015; 
Strauch et al., 2019). 
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stakeholders (Gregory, 2002; Kooiman and Jentoft, 2009). It posits that 
rational, quantitative models are not morally or cognitively superior to 
other models, including strategies to avoid or redefine value conflicts 
(Tetlock et al., 1996; Turner et al., 2015). 
2.2. Positive dimension: modelling trade-offs 
A rapidly growing body of literature uses quantitative models for 
positive analysis of trade-offs, which are also called interactions be-
tween ES (reviewed in Seppelt et al., 2013, Mouchet et al., 2014, Lee and 
Lautenbach, 2016, Saidi and Spray, 2018, Agudelo et al., 2020). This 
literature focuses on identifying patterns of spatial and – less commonly 
– temporal (e.g. Renard et al., 2015) co-occurrence of ES supply (natural 
capital), demand (e.g. Bagstad et al., 2017), realised ES, and ES flows. 
Key approaches here include identification of hotspots, where two or 
more ES have high relative values (Lee and Lautenbach, 2016), and ES 
bundle analysis where sets of ES appear together repeatedly (Bennett 
et al., 2009; Saidi and Spray, 2018). 
These trade-off analyses are useful for identification of temporal and 
spatial dynamics of the distributions of ES, with the most sophisticated 
models able to identify causal processes of ES supply and hence future 
trajectories of supply under scenarios of land use and climate change (e. 
g. Qiu et al., 2020). However, relationships between ES supply and 
poverty alleviation remain understudied, masking trade-offs in space 
and time. Temporal variation in ES supply and environmental shocks, as 
well as in political, social and economic conditions, may translate into 
poverty dynamics, and transitions in- and out of poverty (Dorward, 
2009; Barrett and Constas, 2014; Adams et al., 2016). Current poverty 
assessments tend to provide a snapshot in time. Temporal differences in 
poverty status and severity between seasons or years require a move 
away from static measures of poverty and vulnerability in impact 
measurement (both for the baseline and the observed changes) (Hutton 
et al., 2018). Similarly, spatial intra-community differences are con-
cealed by aggregate figures. 
Risk in terms of negative impacts on wellbeing, in combination with 
dependence on ES, further influences poverty outcomes of ES manage-
ment options that may increase benefits but also involve higher expo-
sure to climatic, ecosystem or market dynamics (Barrett and Constas, 
2014). The ability to deal with such temporal variation depends on 
safety nets (in the form of social or natural capital), assets and income 
security, available mobility and diversification options, exposure to 
hazards, rules of access to various resources, etc. (Adams et al., 2016). 
For example, to deal with decreasing fisheries incomes and lean seasons, 
fishermen face a choice of adaptation strategies: exit fisheries, diversify 
or remain fishing (Coulthard, 2012). These adaptation strategies differ 
in the way they reduce risk and vulnerability, but involve costs (lower 
wellbeing): they involve trade-offs in income, job satisfaction from 
fishing and self-actualisation. Fishermen remain fishing and cope with 
the lean seasons whilst their households endure poverty (ibid.). Models 
can help to reveal the trade-offs over time to wellbeing of different 
groups in society associated with different ES management options by 
explicitly identifying how management may change supply. However, 
due to the coupled nature of all social-ecological systems, and feedbacks 
between ES supply and human behaviours, prediction of future liveli-
hood outcomes linked to changing ES dynamics remains extremely 
challenging (Brown et al., 2019). 
2.3. Value dimension of trade-off decisions 
2.3.1. Normative trade-offs, commensurability and justice 
Ethics, emotions, complexity and uncertainty influence which decision- 
making strategy is chosen, and which trade-offs are deemed acceptable 
(Loewenstein et al., 2001; Menzel and Wiek, 2009). To better understand 
how people will respond to trade-off decisions, it is necessary to understand 
which values motivate the decisions of stakeholders at different levels in 
the analysis of trade-offs. Trade-offs involving incommensurable values, 
such as acute poverty versus irreversible ecosystem loss, can elicit resis-
tance, and intense emotional and cognitive reactions such as moral outrage 
(McGraw and Tetlock, 2005; Daw et al., 2015). 
Normative trade-off decisions regarding ecosystem management for 
poverty alleviation also require an evaluation about what is fair and just, 
in terms of values, procedures and outcomes, to understand which de-
cisions are acceptable for stakeholders. Environmental justice has been 
defined along three dimensions: distributional justice (principles and 
processes for sharing costs and benefits), procedural justice (who makes 
decisions and how – see Section 2.3) and recognition (power and respect 
of cultures and knowledges) (Martin, 2013; Martin et al., 2016). Justice 
scholars have discussed how these dimensions intertwine and overlap, 
and how recognition is foundational to issues of procedural and distri-
bution justice (Schlosberg, 2004). McDermott et al. (2013) have added 
the idea of contextual equity which emphasises that people’s different 
assets, capabilities and systemic injustices affect equity outcomes. For 
the analysis of distributional outcomes, Daw et al. (2011) argue for 
disaggregation to demonstrate the value implications for marginalised 
groups and to make trade-off analyses in ecosystem management rele-
vant to poverty alleviation. Disaggregation may start a discussion about 
which principles of justice to apply, whose benefits to prioritise (for 
example by putting higher weight on impacts on disadvantaged groups) 
and losses to accept (Atkinson et al., 2000, Kristrom, 2005), and what 
level of inequality to accept. 
2.3.2. Measuring wellbeing and poverty 
Findings relating to the contribution of ecosystem management for 
poverty alleviation may depend on how poverty and progress towards 
poverty alleviation objectives are measured. More holistic assessments 
of wellbeing may reveal further trade-offs. It is now well recognised that 
poverty is a multi-dimensional concept, which is not necessarily defined 
in the same way in different places, across time and between people 
(Cavender-Bares et al., 2015; Schleicher et al., 2017). Based on the 
principle of value pluralism, trade-off analyses would consider as many 
wellbeing dimensions as possible and deemed relevant by those whose 
wellbeing is measured. This would include the diverse ways in which 
people attribute meaning and wellbeing to the natural environment. 
However, the mainstream global poverty indicators such as GDP per 
capita, often used in possibility-frontier studies for trade-off analysis (e. 
g. Cavender-Bares et al., 2015; King et al., 2015), do not recognise such 
nature-inclusive or nature-dependent wellbeing conceptualisations. In 
practical assessments, such wellbeing elements may be excluded due to 
budget restrictions (Baulch, 1996), political power (who gets to decide 
what is measured?), or the purpose of poverty measurement (Palmer Fry 
et al., 2017). 
Recognition (Section 2.3.1) is linked to poverty and wellbeing but 
rarely considered in empirical analyses of trade-offs. Gross-Camp (2017) 
finds that the ability to control resources and access (the ability to 
exclude non-community members) gives a sense of prestige and recog-
nition of conservation efforts, and motivates the support for community- 
based forestry management regimes in Tanzania even in the absence of 
major tangible benefits. Similarly, Coulthard et al. (2011) find a trade- 
off between the individual costs of insufficient fisheries income and 
unreliable livelihood, and positive benefits of Padu membership 
(customary marine tenure system) in India, in the form of social prestige, 
collective power and the ability to have privileged access to the best 
fisheries. These studies demonstrate that the values associated with 
ecosystem management are much broader than positive trade-off ana-
lyses often assume, and that the value dimensions of trade-off analysis 
can reveal a wider range of trade-offs and lead to a better understanding 
of the diversity of stakeholders’ decisions (Pasgaard and Dawson, 2019). 
2.4. Multi-level decision-making 
The value dimension of trade-off analysis also recognises the process 
of decision-making and the governance systems in which trade-off 
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decisions are embedded. Governance of both natural resources and 
poverty alleviation takes place at multiple levels, and typically sits in 
different ministries and sectors. Governance is defined by the rules and 
processes that control resources and rights and by which decisions are 
made, as well as the distribution and exercise of power and the inclusion 
and participation of multiple stakeholders (Nunan, 2018). Governance 
hence influences trade-off decisions and shapes who wins and who loses, 
whose values are considered legitimate, accounted for and acknowledged. 
Decisions to employ particular policy instruments for ecosystem 
management have different effects on incomes, equity and environ-
mental status (e.g. Persha et al., 2011; Ferraro and Hanauer, 2014). 
These instruments change de jure or de facto property rights and access 
rules, or the benefits that accrue from existing property rights. Whether 
by design or unintentional, they often embody different distributional 
principles and therefore result in different wellbeing outcomes (Pascual 
et al., 2010). The negotiation and selection of these instruments may 
hence be driven by interests of more powerful stakeholders who can 
silence or exclude groups (Chilvers, 2009). Where trade-off decision- 
making processes reproduce existing power imbalances and fail to 
address vested interests, they (re-)enforce disparities in ecosystem 
benefit distribution (Vira et al., 2012). 
This complexity of social-ecological systems and governance creates 
a challenge for effective ecosystem interventions towards the dual ob-
jectives of alleviating poverty and ecological sustainability. A lack of 
shared objectives and prioritisation of these objectives across decision- 
makers may lead to ecosystem management that fails to achieve 
poverty alleviation. This literature review has highlighted that including 
the diverse values held by stakeholders, and the adherence to principles 
for multi-level governance may help to achieve these objectives. 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Case studies 
To exemplify the multiple dimensions of trade-offs in ecosystem 
management for poverty alleviation in a low-income country context, 
we analyse five interdisciplinary research projects funded by the 
Ecosystem Services for Poverty Alleviation (ESPA) programme. The 
selected case studies focused on five different social-ecological systems 
in low-income countries, dealing with different ecosystem interventions 
to alleviate poverty, and using a range of methods to understand values 
held by different stakeholders at multiple levels. Their diversity provides 
an opportunity to demonstrate trade-offs, supported by the Balance 
Sheets Approach to examine the value dimension of trade-offs and the 
multi-level governance systems in which policies are embedded. The 
studies in Bangladesh, Malawi and Eswatini (formerly known as 
Swaziland) focused on trade-offs in more agricultural landscapes, while 
the studies in Kenya and Rwanda explored trade-offs in the use of nat-
ural mangroves and forests, respectively. A detailed description of the 
case studies is included in Appendix A. 
The case study in Bangladesh used a systems-approach to investigate 
the effects of policy decisions in the complex Ganges-Brahmaputra- 
Meghna Delta system on poverty and ecosystems. The project ana-
lysed rice intensification and the expansion of saline aquaculture 
through conversion of rice fields to shrimp farms, as well as the potential 
of agricultural modernisation (e.g. hybrid or genetically modified crop 
varieties, irrigation, diversification). 
The Eswatini case study investigated the impacts of agro-industrial 
development on ES and human wellbeing in the northern lowveld. It 
focused on the area around a large sugarcane plantation, surrounded by 
irrigated sugarcane smallholders organised in independently operating 
associations. The smallholder sugarcane sector was set up through 
extensive land consolidation and irrigation development, resulting in 
several thousand farmers scattered along the banks of the Komati river. 
The Malawi case study focused on the potential of climate smart 
agriculture (CSA) as an alternative to traditional maize farming to 
enable smallholder farmers to increase yields and cope better with 
climate change. It analysed the compatibility of CSA with integrated 
catchment management, which aims for a balance between economic, 
social and environmental objectives, under different economic and cli-
matic scenarios. 
The Kenya study supported the formation of a Payments for 
Ecosystem Services (PES) scheme by generating data on the carbon 
storage potential of the mangrove forest and a baseline study of the 
social and economic situation of two villages in Gazi Bay. The project 
also supported the formation of a Community Forest Association, sup-
porting the community-based organisation ‘Mikoko Pamoja’ in securing 
legal status and ability to receive funds from international carbon 
trading. 
The Rwanda study examined the ability of PES to contribute to the 
national conservation and development goals of the country. The project 
focused on a sample of communities living adjacent to the strictly pro-
tected Afromontane forest of Nyungwe National Park, and evaluated the 
effects of a pilot-PES scheme on forest use and relationships with park 
authorities. 
Multiple qualitative and quantitative research methods were used in 
the case studies to provide a broad picture of the different stakeholders 
and their interests, covering both the positive and value dimensions of 
trade-off analysis (Table 1). The Bangladesh project relied primarily on a 
system dynamic model and quantitative scenario analysis using house-
hold survey and secondary data – as an example of the positive 
dimension of trade-off analysis (Section 2.2). The Kenya project relied 
Table 1 
Main research methods and approaches used in the five case studies.  
Project Macro/national Meso/district or region Micro/local 
Bangladesh  - system dynamic modelling  
- scenario analysis  
- actor network analysis  
- system dynamic modelling  
- scenario analysis  
- downscaled system dynamic modelling  
- literature review  
- secondary data analysis  
- household survey 
Eswatini  - literature review  
- key informant interviews  
- institutional analysis  
- land use mapping  
- carbon stock assessment  
- biomass survey and soil analysis  
- focus group discussions  
- household survey 
Malawi  - policy document review  
- key informant interviews  
- scenario analysis in participatory workshop  
- trade-offs matrix  
- key informant interviews  
- choice experiments  
- multi-criteria analysis  
- group deliberations 
Kenya  - ethnography  
- governance workshop  
- ethnography  
- key-informant interviews  
- governance workshops  
- key-informant interviews  
- focus group discussions  
- household survey 
Rwanda   - negotiation of PES  - interviews  
- community meetings  
- social activity monitoring  
- household survey  
- ecological surveys  
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much more on qualitative approaches to evaluate motivations and at-
titudes, fitting the value dimension of trade-off analysis (Section 2.3). 
The Rwanda project focused primarily on micro-level decisions, even if 
the negotiations of the final PES programme took place at meso-level. 
The projects in Malawi, Kenya and Eswatini employed methods to 
collect primary datasets at both micro- and meso-level, while using 
policy documents and key informants to better understand macro-level 
interests. 
As poverty alleviation was a main, but often compromised objective 
in each of the case studies, we considered the following five questions 
regarding trade-off decisions at each of the macro-, meso- and micro- 
levels in the case study analysis:  
1. Which objectives were pursued by different actors?  
2. Which trade-offs were identified (between ES, stakeholders, in space 
and time)?  
3. What motivated decisions? Which principles and values played a 
role?  
4. Who was involved in the decision-making process?  
5. Who had power to influence decisions? 
Whereas the first two diagnostic questions engage with the presence 
of trade-offs, the latter three questions explore the social and governance 
aspects and origins of those trade-offs. We also evaluated the perma-
nence of the decisions, interventions and outcomes to identify policy 
recommendations for avoiding or mitigating trade-offs. 
The authors first convened a one-day meeting to discuss trade-offs in 
the context of ecosystem management for poverty alleviation, and spe-
cifically within the case studies. After this meeting, in combination with 
the literature review in Section 2, we developed the list of questions 
above. With the exception of the Malawi case, the research projects were 
not designed to focus on trade-offs analysis. Therefore, each of the au-
thors involved in one of the case studies reflected on the range of out-
puts, activities and experiences of their respective projects, which was 
collected using a template with the questions (and sub-questions, plus 
further guidance) (see Appendix A). This served as the data for this 
paper. If studies did not explicitly address a particular question, then 
authors either used their expert knowledge of the case study sites to infer 
the answers, or highlighted the gap as a limitation. Each case study and 
its supporting documentation was probed by at least one other author to 
ensure a consistent approach across the cases. 
3.2. Balance sheets approach 
Various tools and methods exist for the analysis of the positive and 
value dimensions of trade-offs in ecosystem management, that can 
provide evidence and inform trade-off decision-making processes (e.g. 
Cord et al., 2017); Table 1 demonstrates this variety in our five cases. 
One way of organising these methods and linking them to policy- 
relevant social, economic and ecological principles (or decision- 
making criteria) is the Balance Sheets Approach (Turner et al., 2015, 
Turner, 2016, Fig. 1). This approach is a decision-support system, 
providing process and method guidance, which was originally devel-
oped for public sector decision-makers for evidence-based decision- 
making in uncertain and contested policy contexts, but could be adopted 
by, and adjusted to, any level of decision-making and employed by 
different stakeholders.2 It brings together a range of broad principles, 
assessment methods and techniques, to organise (but not aggregate) 
different types of evidence. 
Current applications of the Balance Sheets Approach are limited to 
marine environments in the Global North (Scharin et al., 2016; Turner 
and Schaafsma, 2015); this paper presents a novel application focused 
on the Global South, where budget limitations that force choices be-
tween different development options are often more severe than in the 
Global North. We have expanded the social principles beyond fairness 
and ethical rules, to include governance evaluation principles of inclu-
siveness, legitimacy, transparency and accountability. These were not 
only explicitly added because the design and implementation processes 
of policies and interventions should adhere to these in order to be 
effective (Bennett and Satterfield, 2018; Nunan, 2018), but also because 
they speak to issues of power imbalances (Section 2.4). 
The Balance Sheets Approach starts with a strategic analysis in Sheet 
1 of the policy objectives at national level, primarily within the positive 
dimension of trade-off analysis (Section 2.2). Here, to move beyond 
efficiency towards justice and equity criteria, the social principles 
emphasise the need to disaggregate findings across stakeholders and 
diagnose inequalities at the start of policy processes to legitimately and 
effectively design implementation strategies (Section 2.3). The implicit 
aim of highlighting distributional inequalities in outcomes is to start 
conversations and analyses of ‘acceptable’ inequalities in outcomes, 
feasible actual compensation and compromise options, and causes of 
inequality or limited poverty alleviation. The methods and techniques in 
this sheet are applicable in contexts of relatively slow and simple envi-
ronmental change and provide headline figures and trends for strategic 
analysis (Fig. 1, blue arrow). 
The meso-micro level policy analysis addresses regional economic 
effects, social-cultural conditions and values, as well as systemic effects 
at the scale of the ecosystem or landscape (Sheet 2). Methods and 
techniques in Sheet 2 tend to provide more insight into regional dif-
ferences and dynamics, and impacts on sectors and households. While 
methods for Sheet 1 and 2 fall more so in the positive trade-off dimen-
sion, Sheet 3 most clearly addresses the value dimension of trade-offs 
(Section 2.3), with ethical criteria that reflect collective and cultural 
values or intrinsic values, which require non-monetary trade-off analysis 
(Section 2.3). Moreover, it highlights the importance of critical and 
irreplaceable natural capital and threshold effects underpinning 
ecological sustainability. Sheet 3 is thus crucial for policy design to 
ensure ethically defensible and culturally inclusive design and appraisal 
of ecosystem policies for poverty alleviation, and adherence to the social 
and governance principles (Section 2.4). Sheet 3 is suited to complex 
and dynamic environments with wicked, hard choices between value- 
laden, conflicting goals; its methods and approaches are suitable for 
multidimensionality and plural values. Participatory and deliberative 
approaches are most prominent in Sheet 3, but stakeholder engagement 
and participation in combination with technical expert input would 
increase the legitimacy and effectiveness of trade-off analysis in any of 
the sheets. 
Through these complementary and sequentially linked but over-
lapping steps, operating at different levels of governance and 
complexity, the Balance Sheets Approach is useful to systematically 
analyse trade-offs. First, it forms a decision-support tool that can be 
utilised fully or partially, i.e. focusing on one particular sheet condi-
tioned by the environmental or policy contexts at issue, where the choice 
of techniques should be adapted to the context. Decision-makers may 
reject Sheet 1 and move directly towards Sheet 3, if the values, dynamics 
and stakes involved are highly complex. Alternatively, decision-makers 
may start with analysing complex choices in Sheet 3, and then feed this 
back into regional or national policy analysis in Sheets 2 and 1. Second, 
the Balance Sheets Approach includes an explicit acceptance of the 
notion of plural values, and social, ecological and economic principles 
for the design and evaluation of decisions. Third, it explicitly highlights 
the importance of identification of inequality and emphasises actual 
compensation. 
In the context of ecosystem management for poverty alleviation, the 
Balance Sheets Approach supports decision-makers to address the 
complexities of incommensurate values in resource allocation and al-
lows for trade-off decisions to be revealed and analysed. For example, it 
2 It should be noted that the Balance Sheets Approach does not cover pro-
cedures and rules of decision-making, such as procedures for organisational 
integration or set-up (Nilsson and Weitz, 2019). 
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can be used to identify competing claims such as macro-level objectives 
of economic growth by governments and nature conservation by con-
servationists (Sheet 1), and meso- and micro-level objectives to create 
employment and incomes for different groups through natural capital 
exploitation (Sheets 2 and 3). For all these values and claims, different 
techniques are suitable (lists in Fig. 1 are by no means comprehensive) 
and method choices can become part of a participatory process. There-
fore, the assessment techniques include not only natural capital and ES 
modelling and accounting, but also a diversity of monetary and non- 
monetary valuation methods based on deliberative and group pro-
cesses. Comparing the methods in Table 1 to the Balance Sheets 
Approach (Fig. 1) reveals that the methods used at micro-level in 
particular are suitable for assessment of plural values (Sheet 3), whereas 
some of the techniques employed at macro and meso-level fit on Sheets 1 
and 2. 
The Balance Sheets Approach can be applied in ex-ante assessments 
to steer processes of decision-making; and specifically for trade-off 
analysis, map the interactions between different objectives and fore-
casted impact assessments, to then inform negotiations among actors 
with different goals (Nilsson and Weitz, 2019). In this study, the Balance 
Sheets Approach is applied ex-post as a diagnostic tool to structure the 
diverse evidence base and better understand how decisions were made 
and which perspectives, knowledge, values or priorities were recognised 
or ignored. The Balance Sheets Approach explicitly evaluates the evi-
dence against not only guiding economic principles of efficient and 
equitable resource use but also social principles of justice and inequality 
reduction. The Approach thereby prompts the first two diagnostic 
questions for our case studies (see Section 3.1), as well as a discussion 
about the distributional outcomes and environmental justice, already in 
Sheet 1 and even more strongly as one moves towards Sheet 3, and the 
underlying processes involving power and influence where some win 
and others lose, prompting the remaining three questions. 
In Section 4 we apply the Balance Sheets Approach to structure the 
analysis and evidence of some of the main trade-offs emerging in our five 
case studies. 
4. Results and discussion 
In this section, we draw on our five case studies to discuss the extent 
to which policy objectives were shared and aligned across different 
stakeholders and different governance levels (Section 4.1), and what the 
main trade-offs identified between poverty alleviation and other policy 
objectives were (Sections 4.2 and 4.3.1). Subsequently, we analyse 
where these trade-offs originated, linking this to social and governance 
principles (Section 4.3). In Section 4.4, we reflect on the emerging les-
sons learned in our trade-off analyses relating these to the reviewed 
literature (Section 2) and the principles included in the Balance Sheets 
Approach, and on the use of the Balance Sheets Approach to highlight 
important aspects of trade-off analysis. 
4.1. Objectives of ecosystem management at different levels 
Responses to the first question showed that the objectives of stake-
holders varied across levels in all case studies, with micro-level moti-
vations often deviating from meso- and macro-level interests (Table 2). 
The macro- and meso-level stakeholders in Bangladesh and Eswatini 
were primarily interested in economic growth and generating foreign 
exchange through agricultural development and stimulating rural live-
lihoods through cash crops. In Bangladesh, macro-level policy focused 
on rice intensification and conversion of rice fields to shrimp farms, and 
Fig. 1. Balance Sheets Approach. Adapted from Turner (2016). 
Notes: GDP = Gross Domestic Product, HDI=Human Development Index, GNI = Gross National Income, PES=Payments for Ecosystem Services. 
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at the meso-level on progressive farming and agricultural efficiency, 
through subsidies, micro-credits and hydrological engineering (Lázár 
et al., 2015). At micro-level, the farmers in Bangladesh emphasised the 
security of their livelihoods, which traditional farming offers to some 
extent (Adams et al., 2016). 
In Eswatini, the sugarcane sector received strong support from the 
government, which has traditionally viewed sugarcane as an agent of 
national and rural development considering its large contribution to 
GDP (macro-level). The largest plantations used to be state-owned, and 
smallholder mobilisation and irrigation development happened through 
dedicated agencies. Government provided support through infrastruc-
ture development (including for irrigation), economic incentives to 
producers, technical support to smallholders and strong government 
involvement (Terry and Ogg, 2017). These supporting mechanisms 
sought to stabilise the sugarcane sector and maximise sugarcane pro-
duction at meso-level. At micro-level, households were primarily 
interested in generating income. Households were more likely to get 
involved in sugarcane production if they lived closer to rivers (and were 
thus pre-selected), but practically all households decided to engage in 
the sector due to readily available irrigation, access to credit (via in-
stitutions such as sugarcane associations) and perceived higher eco-
nomic gains (Mudombi et al., 2018; von Maltitz et al., 2019). 
The main national agricultural policy in Malawi focuses on farmer 
input subsidies, dominated by fertiliser input for maize, with the aim of 
reducing poverty through national food self-sufficiency. Priorities at 
meso-level were harder to identify. Other than farm subsidies, many 
projects are funded through, and executed by, international donors who 
have multiple objectives around poverty alleviation and sustainable 
ecosystem management. The role of the district becomes one of 
approving suitable projects. District officials who participated in the 
workshop prioritised food security (Schaafsma et al., 2018). At micro- 
level, farmers were also primarily concerned about their family’s food 
security when considering CSA adoption (Schaafsma et al., 2019). Wider 
landscape impacts were not explicitly considered, but some farmers 
stated that they were willing to adopt CSA for the long-term benefits for 
their children. Another factor motivating adoption was concern about 
the wellbeing impact of environmental risks, such as floods and 
droughts. 
Whereas in Kenya and Rwanda the meso- and macro-level stake-
holders involved in the PES projects were primarily interested in forest 
conservation, the primary goal of local stakeholders was to secure their 
livelihoods and ensure their education, housing and fuel. For local 
stakeholders, forest conservation was secondary to being able to access 
forests to obtain ES to fulfil basic needs in the short-term. In Kenya, the 
main motivation at meso- and macro-level for the PES programme was 
forest conservation, with limited efforts to truly devolve power over 
forest resources to local communities (Kairu et al., 2018). The secondary 
motivation was to support livelihoods and generate revenues for the 
forest department and the government. Although local communities 
have similar conservation objectives, there is more interest in future 
mangrove use for local livelihoods and short-term local revenue for 
community development from carbon trading. 
The PES scheme in Rwanda was based on the simple premise that 
paying the ‘right’ amount (as compensation) to communities would 
negate illicit use of park resources. The Rwanda Development Board 
developed the payment method: deposits were paid into a savings and 
cash cooperative, with the aim of increasing money savings so that 
households would become eligible for loans (Martin et al., 2014). While 
the meso-level institutions were afraid that payments would be used 
poorly or create perverse incentives, the communities partly earmarked 
funds to improve housing, education, food security and alternative fuel 
sources. 
The cases show that, at the national level, strategic objectives of 
growth and national development dominated decisions relating to the 
interventions studied in Bangladesh, Kenya and Malawi, which fits 
economic principles of Sheet 1 (Fig. 1). These top-down strategies were 
implemented at meso-level where objectives related to employment, and 
stable sector development (Sheet 2). The meso- and macro-level objec-
tives of the forest policies studied in Kenya and Rwanda adhered to 
ecological principles (conservation), but allowed for resource use to 
raise government revenue. In all cases, these did not clearly match local/ 
micro-level objectives, which focused primarily and by necessity on 
basic needs and security. 
4.2. Main trade-offs with poverty alleviation 
The activities undertaken by different stakeholders at micro-, meso- 
and macro-levels to achieve their disparate objectives led to trade-offs 
between poverty alleviation at micro-level and other objectives (sum-
marised in Table 3). The outcomes of the studied interventions are 
frequently in conflict with social principles of the Balance Sheets 
Approach, related to rights, distributional effects and inclusiveness, as 
well as ecological principles of conservation and long-term resilience. 
The interventions studied in Bangladesh, Eswatini and Malawi ulti-
mately led to trade-offs between on the one hand economic growth 
through promoting efficiency and cash crops, and on the other poverty 
alleviation through providing access, livelihood security, basic needs 
and securing rights. The interventions were only accessible to some, 
often wealthier, actors at micro-level. In Bangladesh, economic growth- 
oriented policies to stimulate rice intensification or conversion to shrimp 
farming, which whilst financially more efficient, employ substantially 
less labour than traditional rice production (Amoako Johnson et al., 
2016) and primarily benefited larger landowners and outside investors 
sometimes through bribery and forced land acquisition (Adams et al., 
2016). However, a range of conditions including new restrictions on 
ecosystem access meant that marginalised actors could not benefit from 
agricultural development programmes (Adams et al., 2016). Meso-level 
modelling of scenarios of agricultural intensification suggested higher 
Table 2 
Primary objectives of stakeholders at different levels in five case studies, with secondary objectives in brackets.  
Project Macro Meso Micro 
Bangladesh National government: Economic growth for 
poverty alleviation through agricultural 
intensification and coastal defence 
Regional government: Economic growth 
through agricultural development and 
efficiency 
Local households: Secure livelihoods 
Eswatini National government: Rural development and 
poverty alleviation, Economic growth 
Royal Swaziland Sugarcane Corporation: 




Malawi National government: Economic growth and 
national food self-sufficiency 
District government: Food security (forest 
conservation) 
Local households: Food security 
Kenya National government: Conservation 
(Livelihoods, Government revenues) 
County government: Conservation 
(Livelihoods, Government revenues) 
Mikoko Pamoja Community Organisation; local office of Kenya 
Marine & Fisheries Research Institute; local communities: 
(Sustainable) forest use for livelihoods (Conservation) 
Rwanda Rwanda Development Board: Conservation, 
Poverty alleviation 
Nyungwe National Park Authority; 
Forest/biodiversity conservation, (Do no 
harm to people) 
Local communities: Education, housing, fuel, food, (Conservation)  
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incomes for farmers, but also higher exposure to climate and market 
volatility, and lower resilience and potentially higher dependence on 
high-interest loans or other assistance, compared to traditional farming 
techniques (Lázár et al., 2015). The micro-credit schemes in Bangladesh 
to incentivise adoption of rice intensification were supported and 
controlled by the government, but private loans were not. Thus the 
adoption of progressive farming techniques was low, largely due to the 
high initial costs. Overall, agricultural intensification resulted in silta-
tion and a loss of productivity, and increased debts, reduced access to 
land, capital and farm jobs for poor people, ultimately resulting in forced 
migration for those who could afford to do so and further impoverish-
ment for those who could not (Hutton et al., 2018). 
The Malawi case study suggested similar effects of wealth-related 
access and adoption inequalities if limited government funding were 
used to support CSA instead of for continuing fertiliser subsidies. In line 
with findings by Scott (1977) on peasants’ choices of techniques, CSA 
adoption is often not possible for farmers with very small land holdings 
who cannot experiment with new techniques without jeopardising their 
household food security (Schaafsma et al., 2019). Many CSA techniques 
in Malawi were perceived to have higher costs than benefits in the short- 
term, due to their higher labour requirements, lack of manure and 
higher risk. This discouraged many farmers from adopting CSA. CSA 
adoption may increase when accompanied by financial incentives, but 
penalties for farmers not meeting the requirements of this incentive form 
a barrier for poorer households. 
This lack of inclusiveness also transpired in the expansion of indus-
trial cropping in Eswatini through large private plantations, which 
sometimes came with involuntary population movement (despite some 
compensation), while the smallholder-driven expansion was very se-
lective, creating major differences within communities. For example, 
only households close to the Komati River were provided with assistance 
to grow sugarcane (i.e. to access water, allow formation of farmer as-
sociations and market stabilisation), which precipitated differentiated 
access to freshwater within communities, causing a series of tensions 
(Terry and Ogg, 2017; von Maltitz et al., 2019). Government support 
made sugarcane more profitable than other productive uses of land. 
Households involved in sugarcane, whether as plantation workers or as 
sugarcane growers, were consistently better off across multiple mea-
sures and dimensions of wellbeing and more food secure than control 
groups (Mudombi et al., 2018). Consequently, the sugarcane small-
holders have a much better access to credit than non-sugarcane farmers, 
which has further multiplier effects (von Maltitz et al., 2019). 
Regarding the ecological principles, the Bangladesh modelling re-
sults showed that the emphasis of the government on economic growth 
and provisioning services from agriculture and aquaculture would likely 
have a negative and irreversible effect in the longer-term on the supply 
of regulating services, including water quality and quantity, and soil 
stability (Hossain et al., 2016). The degradation of regulating ES may 
undermine long-term poverty alleviation and resilience improvements, 
and furthermore lead to water conflicts across the delta. Such changes in 
the delivery of provisioning and regulating ES following landscape 
conversion were also observed in the sugarcane areas of Eswatini. In this 
case, sugarcane areas were established in former agricultural and forest 
land, affecting the provision of food crops (decline), sugarcane 
(increase) and carbon storage (increase), and possibly in water use due 
to irrigation and intensification (Gasparatos et al., 2018; Romeu-Dalmau 
et al., 2018). 
The studies in Kenya and Rwanda showed similar trade-offs between 
long- and short-term goals, with longer-term conservation benefits at the 
expense of shorter-term poverty alleviation or perceived household 
benefits. In Rwanda, the initial funds were primarily used to invest in 
infrastructure, the development of the payment mechanism (imposed by 
authorities), and a number of tree and bamboo nurseries (Martin et al., 
2014). Not only do these plantations have a considerable time lag before 
becoming productive, households also felt that they did not benefit from 
the project, where they could not use the forest but also received no 
compensation or alternative source of energy and materials. Such time 
lags may also become a burden on the Kenyan communities who have to 
keep out of an area of mangrove forest for a period of 25 years, foregoing 
forest benefits such as firewood and timber, in exchange for annual in-
come and an improved mangrove forest for the future (Huxham et al., 
2015). But the amount of income going to the community is quite small 
and it could be challenging to maintain the interest and motivation of 
the community over such a long period of time. In both cases, the lack of 
compensation or gains for local communities is likely to affect the local 
support for the conservation projects. The Kenyan local government 
office has been key in raising awareness and providing support and 
encouragement, but this will continue to be needed for years to come. 
4.3. Social and governance aspects of trade-offs with poverty alleviation 
In all case studies, there are clear trade-offs with poverty alleviation. 
These trade-offs originated through different mechanisms and at 
different governance levels of the trade-off analysis and decision-making 
process (Section 2). 
4.3.1. Recognising trade-offs 
In most cases, the trade-offs outlined in Section 4.2 are rather com-
plex and not explicitly recognised, acknowledged or addressed in policy 
and legislation at all levels, generating both opportunities and chal-
lenges for implementation (Diz and Morgera, 2018). That is, the overall 
strategic objectives (Sheet 1), often focused on efficiency, result in trade- 
offs at meso- and micro-level to the detriment of the poor. 
For example, Kenyan policies in coastal zone mangrove forests pur-
sue conservation aims whilst also providing livelihoods and generating 
revenue for the government (Nunan et al., 2016). The incompatibility of 
objectives of decision-makers also meant that conservation objectives 
are traded off against revenue generation: the forest department sells 
timber licences, but does not strictly monitor or control the amount of 
timber extraction. As described in Section 4.2, the design of the payment 
schemes in Rwanda and Kenya failed to recognise the temporal trade- 
offs experienced at micro-level. 
The meso-level trade-off analysis in Malawi forced policy-makers in a 
participatory scenario workshop to think about the compatibility of the 
objectives of river basin management and CSA over wider time and 
spatial scales (Schaafsma et al., 2018). The results showed that tree- 
planting and conservation agriculture would be the most promising 
CSA techniques. But under scenarios of severe climatic change and 
Table 3 
Trade-offs and potential risks and impacts.  
Trade-offs Risks / Impact Case study 
Efficiency (agriculture) vs. debt, access (to resources and technology) Adoption inequality, increased poverty Malawi, Bangladesh, 
Eswatini 
Cash crops vs. security, basic needs and rights Food insecurity, energy insecurity, forced migration, land 
dispossession 
Bangladesh, Eswatini 
Economic growth/rural development and provisioning services vs. sustainable 
regulating services 
Lower resilience, poverty, water conflicts, food insecurity Bangladesh, Eswatini 
Longer-term conservation objectives vs. short-term costs of conservation, low 
compensation 
Lack of local support Kenya, Rwanda  
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negative economic growth, even these techniques would have trade-offs 
with yield maximisation, poverty alleviation, equity and environmental 
management objectives, mainly because the government would lack 
budgets to implement projects to acceptable standards and address such 
trade-offs. Participants also saw lack of coordination between agricul-
ture, forestry, climate or water departments as a barrier to effective 
implementation of techniques. 
The trade-offs and value conflicts over time and between sectors and 
ES in the Bangladesh case were revealed by the systems model that 
showed the results of very complex processes by which the poorest and 
most vulnerable people lose out (Hutton et al., 2018). 
These examples suggest the difficulty of anticipating and integrating 
trade-offs in policies and local interventions, especially considering the 
lack of local capacity (see Section 4.3.4). In both the Malawi and 
Bangladesh studies, the use of trade-off analysis methods (modelling, 
matrices, scenarios) helped to reveal conflicting objectives. 
4.3.2. Process of decision-making 
In cases of complexity and lack of policy coherence (Section 4.3.1), 
improving the transparency and inclusiveness of trade-off decision- 
making processes may help improve social equity outcomes (Law et al., 
2018, Sheet 3 – social principles). Nonetheless, different opinions about 
the fairness of outcomes may remain (Section 2.4). As highlighted by 
McDermott et al. (2013) for PES schemes, in any intervention it is 
important to understand who defines what constitutes equity (if it has 
even been considered). 
In Rwanda, the involvement and power of the park management and 
District level authorities meant that these actors could influence the 
design of the PES scheme, and thereby directly influence the emergence 
of trade-offs. For example, park management wanted to reduce the 
amount that was paid as cash to households rather than communities, as 
well as the amount paid to the highest users of forest resources. The 
rationale was two-fold: (1) the park authority viewed payment to the 
highest forest users as a perverse incentive and (2) funnelling the money 
to community-level activities was aligned with District Level develop-
ment objectives, i.e. creation of infrastructure and communal services 
like schools or maternity wards. The decision of how to distribute the 
money was made in a series of village level community meetings that 
were carefully designed in an iterative process and were relatively well 
attended. However, despite attempts to ensure meaningful participa-
tion, it may be that the outcomes were steered by local government 
authorities influenced by demands from the park and District level au-
thorities. In the end, this led to some discontent with the project in 
relation to the low household-level payments, but not necessarily with 
community processes of decision-making. 
In the Rwanda and Malawi studies, the transparency and modalities 
of the payments were prioritised over the amount disbursed. The 
deliberative methods in Malawi revealed that farmers would only accept 
an effort-based incentive for CSA adoption if transparency could be 
ensured, but they preferred a flat rate in case of lack of transparency. 
There was little support among farmers for pro-poor payments to sup-
port elderly, less-abled or single mothers. Such concerns over the 
transparency of allocating funds may originate in farmers’ experience 
with fertiliser subsidy distribution, where social norms within commu-
nities create trade-offs: older members and those well acquainted with 
the chief tend to receive higher fertiliser subsidies than younger farmers. 
Participants in the study wanted to avoid replicating such non- 
transparent processes. In Rwanda, the authorities imposed the pay-
ment mechanism, assuming that the transparency of household saving 
accounts would enhance support for the conservation project and reduce 
illicit activities in the park. However, the costs of this mechanism 
reduced the pay-out to communities and households. 
The case of Eswatini shows this interplay and possible tensions be-
tween inclusiveness, transparency and fairness (Sheet 3). One of the 
conditions for smallholders to receive irrigation (and thus the ability to 
grow sugarcane) was to organise in farmer organisations that operate as 
community enterprises with equal sharing of dividends between farmers 
(von Maltitz et al., 2019). This equal division increased transparency, 
the negotiating power with mills and input providers, and the ability to 
access credit, but has also created tension (Terry and Ogg, 2017). Some 
of the households that provided larger plots of land during the consol-
idation process perceived the equal share of dividends, as mandated by 
the government to enhance inclusiveness to the benefits of irrigation and 
sugarcane production, as inherently unfair. 
4.3.3. Power and control 
Some of the trade-offs between policy objectives originate in un-
balanced power relationships between organisations at different levels 
that prohibit meaningful participation (Ellis et al., 2019, Martín-López 
et al., 2019, Sheet 3). 
For example, the devolution of power from national to county gov-
ernments in Kenya may affect natural resource governance, especially in 
cases of unclear allocation of roles and power between officers employed 
by national and county government. Even more so, the manner in which 
participatory forest management is implemented limits effective 
participation. Revenue from timber extraction licences is kept by the 
government rather than shared with Community Forest Associations 
(Mogoi et al., 2012), reflecting the reluctance of the government to share 
power and resources (Kairu et al., 2018). The policy being implemented 
reflects a trade-off between the need to involve resource users and the 
reluctance to share too much power or resources, or to cede control. As 
such, how well participatory forest management is supported and is 
perceived to perform remains unclear. 
Unequal power also resulted in the emergence of trade-offs in some 
cases. For example, the power and control held by the Rwandan park 
authority meant that they unilaterally decided on the type of payment 
and the payment mechanism. These decisions did not directly involve 
the local communities. Only when the university partner negotiated that 
communities should have a say in the allocation of funds was a process 
set up to negotiate PES contracts. 
Finally, top-down processes affected different types of trade-offs. In 
particular, the land- and associated water- development projects for cash 
crops in Bangladesh and Eswatini were top-down processes to achieve 
national economic growth and rural development. In Bangladesh, 
growth strategies came at the detriment of the poorest: land evictions, 
forced either by the government or by wealthy investors, affected poor 
households disproportionately (Haque, 2018). In Eswatini, the top- 
down decisions of the government parastatal coordinating the devel-
opment of irrigation and sugarcane production included the selection of 
project beneficiaries (i.e. households close to the river) and benefit- 
sharing mechanism (i.e. equal dividends regardless of land allocation) 
(Terry and Ogg, 2017; von Maltitz et al., 2019). This created unequal 
power and control over water resources within local communities, with 
the legitimacy of the arrangement being contested by other community 
members, and catalysing many tensions over water, especially during 
the 2015–2016 droughts. Such inequality-raising decisions hence lead to 
trade-offs at micro-level that may undermine long-term efficiency and 
sustainability. 
4.3.4. Sustained policy implementation, capability and commitment 
Effectiveness of ecosystem management for poverty alleviation de-
pends on the capability of governance actors to implement the in-
terventions and adhere to good governance principles in order to avoid 
or mitigate trade-offs jeopardising poverty alleviation (Lockwood et al., 
2010; Nunan, 2018). 
The Kenyan case showed that prolonged local government support 
was needed to set up and support the community organisation Mikoko 
Pamoja. Indeed, devolving power to local resource managers may 
require investment in social capital, e.g. adult literacy and leadership 
training to effectively take command of resources (Leach et al., 1999). 
Without such investment, prevention of extraction of forest products 
from the mangrove forests will become harder, due to challenges in 
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maintaining monitoring of the forests, the operation of the community 
organisation and wider community support. 
In Bangladesh, a key reason why policies are not implemented or 
taken-up at micro-level is the lack of investment or effort from local and 
regional governments for implementation on the ground, for example, to 
address indebtedness. Without such support, changing farming practices 
is simply too costly and risky for farmers in the short-term. Other sup-
port that could have built the capacity of farmers to benefit from agri-
cultural intensification, such as government investment at macro- and 
meso-level in education, enforcement of land rights, law and order, 
and the funding of extension workers were also limited, if not absent. 
Similarly, the large-scale adoption and sustained use of CSA practices 
is unlikely to take off in Malawi as long as the majority of the agricul-
tural budget is directed to fertiliser subsidies. The 2016 National Agri-
cultural Policy includes a section on CSA, but only sets yield objectives 
and does not foresee any funding to support CSA. Districts can effec-
tively only attract and approve donor-funded CSA projects, and have 
little capacity to mitigate any trade-offs between CSA’s positive and 
negative social or environmental outcomes. 
On the other hand, the case study in Eswatini shows that with suf-
ficient government support and buy-in from other major players, the 
large-scale promotion of irrigation and sugarcane production was able 
to improve the livelihoods of many local community members 
(Mudombi et al., 2018; von Maltitz et al., 2019). This required long-term 
and large-scale efforts and coordinated actions between the national 
government, traditional local authorities, international funders and not 
least the private sector. A key factor that facilitated this process was that 
the development of the project was overseen by a parastatal agency, 
which helped achieve buy-in from all major actors (Terry and Ogg, 
2017). Overall, the project enabled many smallholders to benefit from 
the growth strategy, but nonetheless did not overcome water conflicts in 
times of drought. 
4.4. Lessons for trade-off analysis and decisions in ecosystem 
management for poverty alleviation 
The analysis of our case studies suggests a number of lessons for 
trade-off analysis relating to the positive and value dimensions of trade- 
off analyses (Section 2), the principles for multi-level governance eval-
uation, and the use of the Balance Sheets Approach. 
Firstly, trade-off analysis needs to consider longer temporal scales, to 
make sure that the negative effects of environmental degradation on 
poverty are considered (Rodríguez et al., 2006, Section 2.2). Only 
through taking a longer-term view did the case study in Bangladesh 
reveal the looming threshold for regulating services (section 4.2). Pos-
itive trade-off analysis methods, such as systems-models and scenario 
analyses, can be helpful in revealing such feedback and dynamics 
(Schlüter et al., 2012). Some of the trade-offs, and the mechanisms 
through which they emerged, demonstrated lack of capability and ca-
pacity among micro- to meso-level actors to benefit from measures that 
would be sustainable and beneficial in the longer term. Many of the 
trade-off decisions to promote ecologically sustainable methods (e.g. 
conservation, CSA, conventional farming) would simply not generate 
sufficient income or benefits to alleviate poverty, by monetary standards 
as well as by broader measures such as food and energy security. Climate 
and market risks and delayed benefits are particularly hard to overcome 
(Barrett and Constas, 2014). In such contexts, further support is neces-
sary (Porras and Asquith, 2018). Where funding, whether from gov-
ernment, donors or market-based instruments, does not provide 
adequate compensation for short-term costs (including opportunity 
costs and foregone benefits), then the distribution of outcomes may 
become unjust (Green et al., 2018). 
The second lesson, related to the value dimension of trade-offs, is that 
trade-off analysis needs to understand the underlying motivations of 
decision-makers at all levels, and recognise their claims to benefits, 
ownership or rights, i.e. recognition justice (Martin et al., 2016, Section 
2.3.1). In many of our case studies, conflicts between micro- and meso/ 
macro-level motivations resulted in outcomes at the expense of 
increasing wellbeing of the poorest in the case study communities. Mo-
tivations and preferences at micro-level were not always considered, 
acknowledged, reflected or addressed in policies developed at macro- 
level, while considerations at macro-level were not supported at micro- 
level. In turn, this can lead to negative feedbacks in behaviour and out-
comes (i.e. conflicts), and ultimately, policy failure (Dawson et al., 2017). 
Thirdly, trade-off analysis is inherently an issue of distributional 
equity and fairness (Section 2.3.1). Some of our case studies demon-
strated unequal distributions between meso- and micro-level forest 
revenues, and between those able to take up cash crops or new farming 
techniques and those who did not participate, often due to lack of access 
to various capitals (Section 4.2). 
Fourthly, and linked to the second lesson, trade-off analysis needs to 
consider inclusiveness, transparency and fairness in governance and 
decision-making processes including the influence of power and control 
on which decisions are made and on which alternatives people prefer 
(Section 2.4). Local stakeholder groups were frequently not involved in 
negotiation of modalities, access and trade-offs associated with different 
interventions, and did not have the power to influence rule- and 
decision-making. Powerful actors were generally reluctant to transfer 
that power and instead used it to increase their benefits by manipulating 
the process of decision-making. Conversely, actors without power 
preferred solutions with high transparency, sometimes at the cost of 
lower distributive outcomes for themselves. Understanding such power 
struggles helps to understand existing barriers to poverty alleviation, 
and addressing these may increase the effectiveness of interventions 
(Nunan et al., 2018). Synergies between ecosystem management and 
poverty alleviation are more likely to occur where such processes 
manage to consider meaningfully all benefits and costs to different 
stakeholders (Howe et al., 2014). The involvement and buy-in of mul-
tiple stakeholders can help to support the trade-off decision-making 
process, recognise multiple values, and develop a shared understanding 
and reveal effects that are morally undesirable (and therefore sometimes 
actively or passively ignored or neglected) (Galafassi et al., 2017; Zia 
et al., 2011). 
In such contexts, decision support systems such as the Balance Sheets 
Approach that emphasise methods to foster deliberation and discussion 
to pre-empt potential conflict and increase actors’ perception of legiti-
macy of the governance system, can be particularly useful in ex-ante 
processes. Applied ex-post, such as in this paper, the Balance Sheets 
Approach provides a tool to diagnose the presence and origin of trade- 
offs. Moreover, the approach sets out different social, economic and 
environmental principles to evaluate trade-off decisions and their out-
comes. The analysis in Section 4.3 showed that many of the trade-offs 
could be traced back to violations of the social and governance princi-
ples in the Sheets. Section 4.3 results showed that ecosystem manage-
ment strategies for poverty alleviation formulated at macro-level (Sheet 
1) quickly become complex, with multiple conflicting values and trade- 
offs, at meso- and micro-level. The Balance Sheets Approach provides for 
such contexts through the approaches in Sheet 3 with the aim of un-
derstanding, pre-empting and addressing complexity and inherent 
trade-offs. 
Finally, we acknowledge that although the selected studies focused 
on a wide array of interventions and associated trade-offs in ecosystem 
management for poverty alleviation, they lacked a jointly developed and 
consistent research design to trade-off analysis. As a result, the main 
trade-offs, underlying mechanisms/dimensions and lessons learned 
outlined in this paper were extracted following the critical analysis of 
the project findings. This also limits the extent to which we can ensure 
the comparability of findings and evaluate the suitability of the different 
methods for analysing the trade-offs emerging in multi-level governance 
of ecosystems for poverty alleviation. There is a need, therefore, for the 
development of consistent and comparable studies spanning across 
multiple contexts and using lenses related to both the positive and value 
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approaches to trade-off analysis. The application of the Balance Sheets 
Approach to structure the analysis and synthesise the findings of such 
studies can further ensure this comparability and generate new insights 
to guide research on trade-off analysis in the context of ecosystem 
management for poverty alleviation. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper addresses the knowledge gap in the literature on trade- 
offs regarding the complexity of these trade-off decisions, amplified by 
the multi-level governance context and inequalities in wealth, interests 
and power between multiple actors. The paper has highlighted the 
multiple dimensions of trade-off analysis in ecosystem management and 
governance for poverty alleviation and has demonstrated approaches to 
support analysis and appraise decisions. In this policy context, trade-offs 
are regularly inevitable. The novelty of the paper is that it comprehen-
sively brings together different dimensions or lenses through which to 
analyse trade-offs in ecosystem management for poverty alleviation in a 
low-income country context, links trade-offs to environmental justice, 
and provides recommendations to reveal and deal with trade-offs. More 
specifically, it shows how the combination of ‘positive’ approaches, 
often used at strategic level, with ‘value’ approaches to analyse multiple 
values, multi-scale governance, power and capacity that underlie such 
complex trade-offs, is necessary to analyse trade-offs. 
In highlighting different areas where trade-offs may originate and 
occur, we implicitly took the position that such transparency, whilst 
increasing complexity, may improve evidence-based decision-making 
and help avoid unintended consequences. Analysing trade-offs is a first 
step in negotiating trade-offs, which is often a messy, incremental pro-
cess that inevitably takes place in a context of power and relations. 
Participation and deliberation processes may increase the comprehen-
siveness of trade-off analyses (Hamilton et al., 2019), increase legiti-
macy and inclusion (Forsyth and Sikor, 2013), and lead to better quality 
of decisions (Chilvers, 2009), especially for the construction of moral 
choices (Roux et al., 2006) involved in ecosystem management for 
poverty alleviation. 
We demonstrated the application of the Balance Sheets Approach, as 
a way of structuring policy appraisal at multiple governance levels and 
for different complexities, to support decision makers and stakeholders 
in addressing the different dimensions of trade-offs in ecosystem man-
agement for poverty alleviation. By highlighting social and governance 
principles, in particular those related to environmental justice and 
legitimacy, it encourages thinking beyond efficiency towards social 
justice and ecological sustainability. This approach also suggests a set of 
complementary methods to reveal trade-offs between incompatible 
values and objectives, which the set of case study questions provided 
further support for. The evaluations showed that emerging trade-offs 
and failure to achieve poverty alleviation objectives originated in 
decision-making processes and governance structures, linked to princi-
ples for effective multi-level governance included in the Sheets. The 
Balance Sheets Approach proved to be sufficiently flexible for applica-
tion to our diverse set of studies, and therefore seems a suitable 
framework for future studies, and more importantly, for actual decision- 
making and implementation of interventions to manage ecosystem ser-
vices for poverty alleviation. 
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Towards systematic analyses of ecosystem service trade-offs and synergies: Main 
concepts, methods and the road ahead. Ecosyst. Serv. 28, 264–272. 
Coulthard, S., 2012. Can we be both resilient and well, and what choices do people have? 
Incorporating agency into the resilience debate from a fisheries perspective. Ecol. 
Soc. 17 (1). 
Coulthard, S., Johnson, D., McGregor, J.A., 2011. Poverty, sustainability and human 
wellbeing: a social wellbeing approach to the global fisheries crisis. Glob. Environ. 
Chang. 21 (2), 453–463. 
Daw, T., Brown, K., Rosendo, S., Pomeroy, R., 2011. Applying the ecosystem services 
concept to poverty alleviation: the need to disaggregate human wellbeing. Environ. 
Conserv. 38 (04), 370–379. 
Daw, T.M., Coulthard, S., Cheung, W.W., Brown, K., Abunge, C., Galafassi, D., 
Peterson, G.D., McClanahan, T.R., Omukoto, J.O., Munyi, L., 2015. Evaluating taboo 
trade-offs in ecosystems services and human wellbeing. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 112 
(22), 6949–6954. 
Dawson, N., Martin, A., 2015. Assessing the contribution of ecosystem services to human 
wellbeing: a disaggregated study in western Rwanda. Ecol. Econ. 117, 62–72. 
Dawson, N., Martin, A., Sikor, T., 2016. Green revolution in sub-Saharan Africa: 
implications of imposed innovation for the wellbeing of rural smallholders. World 
Dev. 78, 204–218. 
Dawson, N.M., Grogan, K., Martin, A., Mertz, O., Pasgaard, M., Rasmussen, L.V., 2017. 
Environmental justice research shows the importance of social feedbacks in 
ecosystem service trade-offs. Ecol. Soc. 22 (3). 
Dearing, J.A., Yang, X., Dong, X., Zhang, E., Chen, X., Langdon, P.G., Zhang, K., 
Zhang, W., Dawson, T.P., 2012. Extending the timescale and range of ecosystem 
services through paleoenvironmental analyses, exemplified in the lower Yangtze 
basin. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 109 (18), E1111–E1120. 
Diz, D., Morgera, E., 2018. Insights for sustainable small-scale fisheries. In: 
Schreckenberg, K., Mace, G., Poudyal, M. (Eds.), Ecosystem Services and Poverty 
Alleviation: Trade-Offs and Governance. Routledge, Abingdon, pp. 288–301. 
Dorward, A., 2009. Integrating contested aspirations, processes and policy: development 
as hanging in, stepping up and stepping out. Dev. Policy Rev. 27 (2), 131–146. 
Ellis, E.C., Pascual, U., Mertz, O., 2019. Ecosystem services and nature’s contribution to 
people: negotiating diverse values and trade-offs in land systems. Curr. Opin. 
Environ. Sustain. 38, 86–94. 
FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, 2019. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the 
World 2019. Safeguarding against Economic Slowdowns and Downturns. FAO, 
Rome.  
Ferraro, P.J., Hanauer, M.M., 2014. Quantifying causal mechanisms to determine how 
protected areas affect poverty through changes in ecosystem services and 
infrastructure. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 111 (11), 4332–4337. 
Finkbeiner, E.M., Micheli, F., Bennett, N.J., Ayers, A.L., Le Cornu, E., Doerr, A.N., 2018. 
Exploring trade-offs in climate change response in the context of Pacific Island 
fisheries. Mar. Policy 88, 359–364. 
Forsyth, T., Sikor, T., 2013. Forests, development and the globalisation of justice. Geogr. 
J. 179 (2), 114–121. 
Galafassi, D., Daw, T., Munyi, L., Brown, K., Barnaud, C., Fazey, I., 2017. Learning about 
social-ecological trade-offs. Ecol. Soc. 22 (1). 
Gasparatos, A., Romeu-Dalmau, C., von Maltitz, G., Johnson, F.X., Shackleton, C., 
Jarzebski, M.P., Jumbe, C., Ochieng, C., Mudombi, S., Nyambane, A., Willis, K.J., 
2018. Mechanisms and indicators for assessing the impact of biofuel feedstock 
production on ecosystem services. Biomass Bioener 114, 157–173. 
Gray, L.C., Moseley, W.G., 2005. A geographical perspective on poverty–environment 
interactions. Geogr. J. 171 (1), 9–23. 
Green, J.M., Fisher, B., Green, R.E., Makero, J., Platts, P.J., Robert, N., Schaafsma, M., 
Turner, R.K., Balmford, A., 2018. Local costs of conservation exceed those borne by 
the global majority. Global Ecol. Conserv. 14 (p.e00385).  
Gregory, R.S., 2002. Incorporating value trade-offs into community-based environmental 
risk decisions. Environ. Values 461–488. 
Gross-Camp, N., 2017. Tanzania’s community forests: their impact on human wellbeing 
and persistence in spite of the lack of benefit. Ecol. Soc. 22 (1). 
Hadari, S.A., 1988. Value trade-off. J. Polit. 50 (3), 655–676. 
Hamilton, M., Salerno, J., Fischer, A.P., 2019. Cognition of complexity and trade-offs in a 
wildfire-prone social-ecological system. Environ. Res. Lett. 14 (12), 125017. 
Haque, M., 2018. Bangladesh land conflict monitoring report. In: ANGOC (Ed.), Defense 
of Land Rights: A Monitoring Report of Land Conflicts in Six Asian Countries. 
ANGOC, Quezon City, pp. 46–57. 
Hirsch, P.D., Adams, W.M., Brosius, J.P., Zia, A., Bariola, N., Dammert, J.L., 2011. 
Acknowledging conservation trade-offs and embracing complexity. Conserv. Biol. 25 
(2), 259–264. 
Holland, A., 2002. Are choices tradeoffs? In: Bromley, D.W., Paavola, J. (Eds.), 
Economics, Ethics, and Environmental Policy: Contested Choices. Blackwell 
Publishing, Oxford, pp. 17–34. 
Hossain, M.S., Dearing, J.A., Rahman, M.M., Salehin, M., 2016. Recent changes in 
ecosystem services and human wellbeing in the Bangladesh coastal zone. Reg. 
Environ. Chang. 16, 429–443. 
Howe, C., Suich, H., Vira, B., Mace, G.M., 2014. Creating win-wins from trade-offs? 
Ecosystem services for human wellbeing: a meta-analysis of ecosystem service trade- 
offs and synergies in the real world. Glob. Environ. Chang. 28, 263–275. 
Hutton, C., Nicholls, R., Lázár, A., Chapman, A., Schaafsma, M., Salehin, M., 2018. 
Potential trade-offs between the sustainable development goals in coastal 
Bangladesh. Sustainability 10 (4), 1108. 
Huxham, M., Emerton, L., Kairo, J., Munyi, F., Abdirizak, H., Hillams, T., Nunan, F., 
Briers, R., 2015. Applying climate compatible development and economic valuation 
to coastal management: a case study of Kenya’s mangrove forests. J. Environ. 
Manag. 157, 168–181. 
Kairu, A., Upton, C., Huxham, M., Kotut, K., Mbeche, R., Kairo, J., 2018. From shiny 
shoes to muddy reality: understanding how meso-state actors negotiate the 
implementation gap in participatory forest management. Soc. Nat. Resour. 31, 
74–88. 
Keeney, R.L., 1982. Decision analysis: an overview. Oper. Res. 30 (5), 803–838. 
King, E., Cavender-Bares, J., Balvanera, P., Mwampamba, T.H., Polasky, S., 2015. Trade- 
offs in ecosystem services and varying stakeholder preferences: evaluating conflicts, 
obstacles, and opportunities. Ecol. Soc. 20 (3), 25. 
Kohler, F., Holland, T.G., Kotiaho, J.S., Desrousseaux, M., Potts, M.D., 2019. Embracing 
diverse worldviews to share planet earth. Conserv. Biol. 33 (5), 1014–1022. 
Kooiman, J., Jentoft, S., 2009. Meta-governance: values, norms and principles, and the 
making of hard choices. Public Adm. 87 (4), 818–836. 
Kowarsch, M., Flachsland, C., Garard, J., Jabbour, J., Riousset, P., 2017. The treatment of 
divergent viewpoints in global environmental assessments. Environ. Sci. Pol. 77, 
225–234. 
Kristrom, B., 2005. Framework for assessing the distribution of financial effects of 
environmental policies. In: Serret, Y., Johnston, N. (Eds.), The Distributional Effects 
of Environmental Policy. Edward Elgar, Chelthenham, pp. 79–136. 
Lautenbach, S., Mupepele, A.C., Dormann, C.F., Lee, H., Schmidt, S., Scholte, S.S., 
Seppelt, R., van Teeffelen, A.J., Verhagen, W., Volk, M., 2019. Blind spots in 
ecosystem services research and implementation. Reg. Environ. Chang. 19, 
2151–5172. 
Law, E.A., Bennett, N.J., Ives, C.D., Friedman, R., Davis, K.J., Archibald, C., Wilson, K.A., 
2018. Equity trade-offs in conservation decision making. Conserv. Biol. 32 (2), 
294–303. 
Lázár, A.N., Clarke, D., Adams, H., Akanda, A.R., Szabo, S., Nicholls, R.J., Matthews, Z., 
Begum, D., Saleh, A.F.M., Abedin, M.A., Payo, A., 2015. Agricultural livelihoods in 
coastal Bangladesh under climate and environmental change–a model framework. 
Environ Sci Process Impacts 17 (6), 1018–1031. 
Leach, M., Mearns, R., Scoones, I., 1999. Environmental entitlements: dynamics and 
institutions in community-based natural resource management. World Dev. 27 (2), 
225–247. 
Lee, H., Lautenbach, S., 2016. A quantitative review of relationships between ecosystem 
services. Ecol. Indic. 66, 340–351. 
Lele, S., Springate-Baginski, O., Lakerveld, R., Deb, D., Dash, P., 2013. Ecosystem 
services: origins, contributions, pitfalls, and alternatives. Conserv. Soc. 11 (4), 343. 
Lockwood, M., Davidson, J., Curtis, A., Stratford, E., Griffith, R., 2010. Governance 
principles for natural resource management. Soc. Nat. Resour. 23 (10), 986–1001. 
Loewenstein, G.F., Weber, E.U., Hsee, C.K., Welch, N., 2001. Risk as feelings. Psychol. 
Bull. 127 (2), 267. 
Mace, G., Schreckenberg, K., Poudyal, M., 2018. Ecosystem services for human 
wellbeing: Trade-offs and governance. In: Schreckenberg, K., Mace, G., Poudyal, M. 
(Eds.), Ecosystem Services and Poverty Alleviation: Trade-Offs and Governance. 
Routledge, Abingdon, pp. 305–316. 
Martin, A., 2013. Global environmental in/justice, in practice: introduction. Geogr. J. 
179 (2), 98–104. 
Martin, A., Gross-Camp, N., Kebede, B., McGuire, S., 2014. Measuring effectiveness, 
efficiency and equity in an experimental payments for ecosystem services trial. Glob. 
Environ. Chang. 28, 216–226. 
Martin, A., Coolsaet, B., Corbera, E., Dawson, N.M., Fraser, J.A., Lehmann, I., 
Rodriguez, I., 2016. Justice and conservation: the need to incorporate recognition. 
Biol. Conserv. 197, 254–261. 
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